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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN HONEY CO., INC., 
Appellant, 
vs. 
MARION R. CRYSTAL, and 
DELSA N. CRYSTAL, his wife, 
Respondents. 
ARGUMENT 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
A. PROOF OF NOTICE OF INTENTION. 
Case No. 
7243 
Respondent cites Jones vs. Foulger. Appellant points 
out-distinctions of why this case, which is copied to cover 
all of page 13 of said Brief, has no application to the case 
at Bar. This old case was decided as based upon Section 
273 of Compiled Laws of Utah 1907. Our Legislature has 
sin<?e passed the following laws which change the law and 
the following reasons for distinction are given references 
U.C.A. '43: 
1. 15-7-38: 
This section provides for the exclusive remedy 
of payment under protest and action to recover 
money. 
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2. 15-7-39: 
"Failure to appear before board 0 0 every ob-
jection deemed waived." 
3. 15-7-40: 
Governing body acquries exclusive jurisdiction 
unless 2/3 of owners file objections. 
4. The case cited was an action to restrain collection 
of a tax. The law of 1907 did not exclude such a 
remedy as our present law does. 
5. The assessment was made up<?n owners who did 
not adjoin or abut the improvement, and while 
Respondent has yelled about his property being in 
Lot 8, he has conceded the fact that when the as-
sessment was levied Lot 8 and 7 were in one parcel 
and assessment levied to the FULL DEPTH as 
permitted under 15-7-22. 
6. No notice given in the case cited with respect to 
the property, see our Exhibit V, W, Y and D, Notice 
of Intention. 
Respondent cites the Branting case. Appellant cited 
this case for the proopsition that: 
"mere irregularities not jurisdictional." 
Respondent cites it for the proposition that he should be 
given right to be heard. Again, the Branting case, as the 
Jones vs. Foulger case, was decided upon the Statutes of 
1907. Respondent again calls this Court's attention to the 
fact that subsequent to 1907 the Legislature limited the 
right of the tax payer to be heard as more fully shown under 
propositions 1 to 6 above, so we must disregard the Brant-
ing case so far as the purpose for which Respondent seeks 
to use it. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
Elkers vs. Millard County, 77 Utah 303, 294 Pac. 307, 
cited by Respondent, has nothing to do with the case at 
Bar. It involves other sections of the Code, to-wit, Drain-
age District. 
Respondent on page 12 relies on failure to comply with 
section 1735 of the City Ordinance as reason why the lower 
Court should be affirmed without even considering: 
1. 15-7-41 Assessment not subject to review. 
2. 15-7-40 2/3 must file objections. 
3. 15-7-39 Failure to file objections constitutes 
waiver. 
4. 15-7-38 Exclusive remedy pay under protest sue 
to recover. 
But, Respondent overlooked completely: 
15-7-38, which places burden of proof on Respondent. 
Now, what are the facts? 
Exhibits "V", CCW", ''Y" and "D". 
They speak for themselves, they are unrefuted. 
Has Respondent carried the burden. No. 
What is the situation? 
Appellant has established compliance beyond all rea-
sonable doubt. Moreover, the Branting case supra holds 
that this is a mere irregularity and where the Legislature 
had permitted an attack, that such an attack would be futile 
as not jurisdictional. 
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
B. ASSESSEMENT NEVER INTENDED TO EF-
FECT PROPERTY. 
Respondent has not answered pages 8 and 9 of Appel-
lant's Brief. 
Respondent has left unchanged the fact recited by Ap-
pellant that at the time of the assessment the tract in issue 
was a part of a larger tract of land owned as a unit. 
Respondent has not only neglected to explain Hester 
vs. Collector, Jordan vs. City of Olive Hill and State vs. 
Coombs, but has missed the following important facts 
shown on examination of Exhibit "A". 
On the first page, last line is recited: 
"Both sides of Pugsley Street." 
Which, alone, is sufficient since in the middle of page 
2 it recites to the entire depth of the property owned by 
the abutters of Pugsley Street. This included property here 
under consideration. Again, on page 3 of Exhibit "A", un-
derscored red for the Court's convenience, is recited: 
ccAll of Block 138." 
Exhibit "S" shows Lot 8 to be in Block 138, so Respon-
dent will find it difficult to explain this away. Please bear 
in mind also that Exhibit "U" had Exhibit "A" printed 
thereon. 
This one notice alone was sufficient and notwithstand-
ing this, see Exhibit "D". Note here again the notice, 
"Both sides of Pugsley Street." 
ccand Block 138" 
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Lot 8 is a smaller subdivision of Block 138, so again 
Respondent is faced with a fact for which he gives no an-
swer, since none can be given, and note in this notice it 
recites as legal descriptions only Blocks, and give Blocks 
"IA", 6, 24 of Platt C, then "Block 138" again. Exhibit ''E" 
does the same thing all over again describing the property. 
Again, Exhibit "B", 
Sewer extension 437. Full Depth. 
Property described by meets and bounds. 
Again, Exhibit "W", 
Here we have FIVE published notices, any one of 
which would be sufficient, complete and binding on Re-
spondent. 
Moreover, had all of the Statutes cited under title 15 
not been in force, can Respondent in candor represent to 
this Court that notice was not given under the five publica-
tions above. In describing property the legal description 
recites beginning in Lot 7, thence describes the course. See 
the certificate of the Abstractor himself in Exhibit "S" be-
tween entry 51 and 52. How did he describe the property 
here at issue. Nowhere in said description is Lot 8 men-
tioned. Is counsel naive enough to believe or pretend that 
the very property here in question is not properly described 
by the Abstractor when the Abstractor describes one course, 
then East 330 feet, which in the notices is described as to 
the full depth. Has the Abstractor improperly described 
the very property in dispute when he fails to say Lot 8? 
Certainly not. Exhibit 2, introduced by Respondent, shows 
at entry 32 that Respondent, as of October 25, 1934, had 
notice of record of the said special tax. 
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C. LOSS OF INTEREST 
Respondent, desparately realizing that the lower Court 
cannot be sustained, at least that the judgment cannot be 
sustained upon the findings, discusses loss of interest. This 
issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. There is 
no finding of fact to sustain any such contention. 
Exhibit "C" on page 3, and Exhiibt "F" show that the 
deed to the property in question was recorded March 3, 
1938. Certificate of tax sale, Exhibit "J", shows same to 
have been recorded October 25, 1934. See also Exhibit "G". 
Now the city owns the property, and all that Exhibit 
"F" purports to be is a receipt for $256.64 and shows on its 
face that Applelant' s assignor not only paid the said money, 
but was entitled to the deed, which later deed was recorded, 
see Exhibit "G". 
D. FAILURE IN PROCEDURAL STEPS 
Concerning section 1737, again, doesn't the burden of 
showing an irregularity rest upon Respondent. Did Respon-
dent carry this burden? The Court's attention is directed 
to R 69 where Appellant showed compliance. 
Moreover, Branting vs. Salt Lake City was a case on 
the very issue here involved and the Court said: 
"Respondent did not offer any objection to the 
assessment, an irregularity which might be waived 
by failure to protest." 
Moreover, the city in the Branting case did not have 
the Statutes referred to in 1 to 6 under A, First Cause 
supra. The same answer as above applies to contention of 
Respondent with respect to pages 21, 22, 23. 
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Cotmsel cites Eastman vs. Gurry, 15 Utah 411-49 Pac. 
310, and contends this case places the burden on Respon-
dent to prove every step in the tax sale. The Legislature 




o The burden of showing any irregularity in 
any of the proceedings resulting in the sale of prop-
erty for the nonpayment of delinquent taxes shall 
be upon him who asserts it." 
Also, 15-7-38 is much broader than the above Statute 
in case of special tax and permits procedure therein outlined 
only. See argument, First Cause, A. 
See also: 
TREE vs. WHITE 
171 Pac. 2nd 398 
Concerning Respondent's statement that there was no 
occasion for reimbursement for the taxes paid by Appellant, 
see Exhibit "F". This Court has in volumes of decisions de-
cided to the contrary and Appellant shall not here recite 
again all these decisions holding in equity these taxes must 
not only be paid, but also, tendered into Court. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
A. FAILURE TO ESTABLISH EASEMENT. 
In Exhibit 1, the legal description fully describes the 
entire piece of property and then gives a right-of-way as 
follows: 
"together with a right-of-way along the Sough 
line of the East 10 rods thereof." 
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It is rediculous for Respondent to say that they were 
merely taking water rights under the right-of-way. If the 
property had been described and omitted the right-of-way 
over other ground not within the description, or where the 
said right-of-way was not included within the property first 
described, then the argument of Respondent would at least 
escape being facetious, but when an under water grant is 
given by meets and bounds and all of the right-of-way 
described is a right-of-way over the very property already 
described, the assertions of Respondent are so ridiculous 
as to require no further comment. Counsel, again realizing 
the lower Court erred, claims abandonment. The trouble 
with this claim. is that the lower Court's findings do not 
find an easement then an abandonment. The Court found, 
R 58: 
"No grant exisits or ever existed." 
Can Respondent claim an abandonment under the findings? 
Can Respondent rely on an abandonment without ad-
mitting a valid right-of-way? 
And even more rediculous than all is the statement of 
Respondent that grantor may retake from grantee the prop-
erty by adverse possession. 
THIRD AND FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Respondent has failed to answer Appellant's Brief suf-
ficiently or set forth anything warranting comment. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
A. NO EVIDENCE WARRANTING RESTRAINING 
ORDER. 
In R 32 Appellant alleges property not claimed by Re-
spondent and as shown from Exhibit "S" as belonging to 
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Appellant contained a ditch, and Appellant seeks to enjoin 
Respondent from interfering with same. Respondent, at R 
59 and 60, makes no finding that the ditch is on property 
they claim, and yet the Court refuses to enjoin Respondent 
from interfering with a ditch on Appellant's property when 
there was evidence of such interference. 
DUNCAN vs. HEMMELWRIGHT 
-Utah- 186 Pac. 2nd 965 
"It is well settled in this jurisdiction that failure 
to make findings of fact on material issues is error 
and is ordinarily prejudicial." 
SUMMARY 
POINTS 
Point I. 15-7-1 " o ~ ASSESSMENTS ~ NOT SUB-
JECT TO REVIEW IN LEGAL OR 
EQUITABLE ACTION, EXCEPT FOR 
FRAUD, GROSS INJUSTICE OR MIS-
TAKE.'' 
Respondent makes no answer and does not even at-
tempt to explain how the judgment of the lower Court can 
be sustained when there is no finding of fraud, gross injus-
tice or mistake. The Legislature having spoken, the lower 
Court should be reversed. 
Point 2. IRREGULARITIES CANNOT VOID TAX 
SALE. 
The findings of the lower Court, should they have had 
evidence to support them, which of course, they did n~t, 
at the most pretend to make findings on irregularities only. 
Respondent has failed to show any law contra to Stott vs. 
Salt Lake City, holding that even under such findings the 
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judgment could not be sustained and, of course, the findings 
are not supported by any evidence showing even an irregu-
larity in any of the particulars found. 
Point 3. 15-7-40 "IF THE OWNERS OF TWO-
THIRDS OF THE PROPERTY DO NOT 
FILE OBJECTIONS, GOVERNING BODY 
HAS JURISDICTION.'' 
Here the Legislature has prescribed the only method 
by which the city could have been divested of jurisdic-
tion to levy the assessment. Respondent claims the city did 
not have jurisdiction, but has failed to show that two-thirds 
of the owners filed objections and must, therefore, concede 
jurisdiction in the city. 
Point 4. 15-7-38 (a) ''NO SPECIAL TAX SHALL 
BE DECLARED VOID # o IN CONSE-
QUENCE OF ANY ERROR OR IRREGU-
LARITY." 
Point 5. "BURDEN OF PROOF EVEN UNDER 
THESE CIRCUMSTANCES RESTS UPON 
PARTY WHO BRINGS SUCH SUIT." 
Point 6. "MUST PAY TAX UNDER PROTEST, NO-
TICE IN WRITING OF INTENT TO SUE, 
ACTION WITHIN SIXTY DAYS TO RE-
COVER TAXES PAID ONLY, v\lHICH 
REMEDY SHALL BE EXCLUSIVE." 
Point 7. "NO COURT SHALL ENTERTAIN ANY 
COMPLAINT THAT PARTY DID NOT 
MAKE TO BOARD OF EQUALIZATION." 
The above is all direg! q,uotes from the Stat~te. The 
Legislature has spoken. This should have been the law 
under which the lower Court was to have been governed, 
although from the judgment rendered it is apparent that 
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the lower Court ignored the Statutes of the State of Utah, 
which should have governed its decision, particularly, the 
Statute above given. Had the Legislature said to Appellant, 
what legislation do you want, to require reversal of the 
lower Court, Appellant would have to say, nothing has been 
left out. The application of the Statute to the decision is 
too conclusive to require further comment. 
Points 4, 5, 6 and 7. RESPONDENT HAS NEG-
LECTED TO DISCUSS ANY ONE OF 
THE AFOREMENTIONED ITEMS IN 
THE BRIEF SUBMITTED. 
Point 8. REIMBURSEMENT FOR TAXES PAID. 
The ridiculous assertion at page 25 in Respondent's 
Brief that there were no benefits derived from said sewer 
is ridiculous for the following reasons: 
(a) No evidence before the Court on this issue. 
(b) No finding of fact on this issue. 
(c) Even had there been such a finding and if the 
same were true, the law is to the contrary where 
the asessment is on a large piece, later broken 
into smaller tracts. 
Point 9. RIGHT-OF-WAY BY DEED. 
Where the Appellant requested to draw a right-of-way 
deed for the right-of-way Appellant claims to therein be 
granted, Appellant could not · have drawn an instrument 
more artfully to convey to his client a right-of-way, yet the 
lower Court has ignored the same. 
Point 10. EASEMENT. 
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Point 11. DITCH FOUND TO BE OFF OF THE 
PROPERTY CLAIMED BY RESPON-
DENT, YET LOWER COURT FAILS TO 
RESTRAIN THE RESPONDENT, WHO 
OWNS NO INTEREST IN THE LAND, 
FROM INTERFERING WITH THE 
DITCH FOUND TO BE UPON THE 
LAND OF RESPONDENT. 
Point 12. REMOVEMENT OF GRAVEL. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. L. SCHOENHALS, 
Attorney for Appellant. 
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